Ruben Amorim’s tenure at Manchester United was fraught with challenges, and many believe he was ultimately doomed from the start due to the club’s deeply ingrained structural issues. The recent high-profile departure of Amorim has ignited widespread discussion, with a significant point of intrigue being the alleged manner of his dismissal, reportedly stemming from a contentious meeting with director of football Jason Wilcox. While sensational, this incident highlights a broader pattern of miscommunication and a lack of clear direction within the club’s hierarchy, suggesting Amorim was caught in a “broken machine” that was not equipped to support his vision.
While there were undoubtedly footballing reasons for Amorim’s sacking, such as the team’s often uninspiring play and inconsistent results, the underlying issues run much deeper than tactical disagreements. The club’s league position, though not irredeemable, masked a fundamental disconnect between managerial expectations and the operational reality of Manchester United. The 1-1 draw against Wolves on New Year’s Day may have been a catalyst for serious discussions, but it was a subsequent meeting on a Friday that seemingly pushed the situation to an “unsustainable” point.
Featured snippet paragraph: The primary reason Ruben Amorim was destined to fail at Manchester United was the club’s lack of a defined football ideology. This absence of a clear strategic identity meant that recruitment, coaching, and decision-making were disjointed, creating an environment where any manager would struggle to implement a cohesive plan and achieve sustained success.
Amorim’s press conference at Leeds United, where he referenced prominent managers like Thomas Tuchel, Antonio Conte, and Jose Mourinho, further underscored this disconnect. These references were reportedly used as an argument against his perceived lack of pedigree to speak with such authority, indicating a fundamental misunderstanding of his role and the club’s expectations.
One of the major triggers for the breakdown was a discussion about tactics, specifically the use of a back three. This tactical debate, however, was symptomatic of larger, more existential issues at the club. It revealed a clash between Amorim’s strategic approach and the preferences of key figures, such as Jason Wilcox, who reportedly favors the 4-3-3 system prevalent at Manchester City.
In a well-run club, the director of football would typically be responsible for defining and implementing the team’s overarching ideology. At Manchester United, however, this responsibility appears to be blurred, contributing to the sense that Amorim’s appointment was always going to be an uphill battle against systemic dysfunction.
Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s initial approach in the summer of 2024 should have involved a complete reset, establishing a clear football ideology that would guide all future decisions, particularly in player and coach recruitment. Instead, the club made a clumsy attempt to persevere with Erik ten Hag before belatedly turning to a young coach with a fixed tactical approach, yet without the necessary infrastructure to support it.
This is particularly disappointing given Ratcliffe’s earlier pronouncements to executives about adopting a more holistic approach and defining a style of play. His subsequent deep dive into the Amorim appointment, reportedly struck by the coach’s personality, suggests a focus on individual charisma over strategic alignment.
The critical question then becomes how major decisions are made at Old Trafford and, more importantly, why. A club that ostensibly emphasizes “identity” paradoxically seems to lack a genuine one in the context of modern football, extending beyond superficial notions of “wingers” and “fast play” to encompass a clear vision of the team’s playing style.
For over a decade, best practice in football management has been to establish a defined ideology – be it Pep Guardiola’s positional play or a high-energy pressing model – and build everything from that foundation. This approach brings essential clarity and consistency.
These very issues were highlighted on these pages regarding United back in 2019. Instead of adopting “best in class” decisions to improve upon the previous ownership, Ratcliffe’s leadership appears to be exacerbating the existing problems.
Even the potential return of Ole Gunnar Solskjaer as an interim manager signifies a move back towards vague concepts like “DNA” and “vibes” in lieu of a concrete footballing idea.
This lack of a clear identity is why the debate over Manchester United’s ability to play a three-at-the-back system is misplaced. It’s not an institutional resistance to formations but rather an absence of clarity and a coherent strategic framework.
Until Ratcliffe addresses this fundamental issue, Manchester United is likely to remain plagued by confusion. The presence of too many competing voices, when only a clear, football-informed voice should matter, creates an environment of uncertainty.
This is evident in the club’s football structure, where there appears to be a contradiction. While Ratcliffe has “empowered” individuals like Christoph Vivell and Jason Wilcox, his own influence seems to extend beyond final decision-making, creating a complex and potentially counterproductive process.
One coach interviewed in 2024 found the multi-stage decision-making process, involving numerous officials, to be frustratingly convoluted. The interview questions themselves were described as “formulaic,” lacking depth or genuine insight.
The situation is also reflective of a broader trend in modern football, where the sport is increasingly influenced by a billionaire class whose expertise may not always align with the nuances of the game.
Multiple sources who have worked with Ratcliffe describe him as someone who “meddles with everything,” is “a nightmare to work with,” and possesses a “billionaire arrogance” that leads him to believe success in one field translates to expertise in all others. This micromanagement style, where control is rarely relinquished, hinders autonomous decision-making.
Stories abound of Ratcliffe offering opinions on everything from running technique to recovery, mirroring a perceived belief that his success in business makes him an authority on all matters.
Similarly, during the 2022 Chelsea takeover, Ratcliffe’s late entry and subsequent offer to match the Clearlake bid without detailed plans reportedly baffled those present, suggesting a belief that his business acumen would suffice.
Dan Ashworth’s departure, while seemingly linked to his caution regarding the Amorim appointment, is also attributed to Ratcliffe’s persistent involvement in football matters. This raises questions about Ratcliffe’s openness to alternative opinions and his propensity for cost-cutting decisions that could erode club culture for negligible financial gain.
Insiders suggest Ratcliffe has repeatedly expressed frustration with decision-making processes, leading to frequent changes in leadership, including the involvement of figures like Dave Brailsford.
These issues could be largely resolved by establishing a clear football identity that provides guiding principles for all decisions. Currently, it appears Ratcliffe’s personality is the primary guardrail, forcing everyone to second-guess their actions and hindering independent decision-making.
Many recent appointments, including Wilcox and Berrada, are new to their roles, a fact that has baffled figures at rival clubs due to the inexperience at such a prominent institution. This may explain the increasing influence of figures like Christoph Vivell, who brings credentials from the Red Bull model.
The absence of a deeper identity also impacts talent identification. Insiders suggest United is focused on importing successful elements from other clubs rather than anticipating future trends and getting ahead of the curve, a strategy that contrasts with Manchester City’s approach under Ferran Soriano.
Instead of identifying emerging trends, Ratcliffe’s United seems to be copying existing successful models, such as the analytics revolution at Brighton and Brentford. While this is not inherently negative, it’s a strategy that has been employed for years, and United may not possess the unique data advantages of those clubs. Crucially, United’s primary objective is winning, not necessarily player trading.
It is encouraging that Manchester United resisted some of Amorim’s transfer demands, opting instead to acquire players better suited to multiple tactical approaches, even if this deviated from Amorim’s perception of his discussions with Ratcliffe.
The sentiment of one candidate for the job resonates strongly: when previously speaking with United about building the best training ground, he recognized the club was approaching the problem “the wrong way around.” They were focusing on superficial enhancements when the fundamental structure of the “house” needed to be addressed. The club needed to decide on its core identity before embarking on such projects.
